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APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
INTRODUCTION 
This case demonstrates the capacity of the litigation 
medium, with its procedural twists and turns, occasionally to permit reality to be distorted or obscured by incomplete or misleading perceptions. The District Court lost sight of 
two central and $Ubstantially indisputable facts, and the 
plaintiff is anxious to perpetuate those misperceptions in 
this forum. 
First, plaintiffs "clear deficiencies" (Findings, App. at 
231 n.8) in her interpersonal relationships, reflected in a 
torrent of non-pretextual "gender-neutral" (Appellee's Br. 
at 13) comments by those who worked with her closely, 
established a "pervasive theme" (Findings, App. at 223) that disqualified her from becoming a Price Waterhouse 
partner. Plaintiff produced a cloud of ink to mask this 
reality, convincing the District Court that all criticisms of 
plaintiff, even if gender-neutral in their expression, were 
potentially tainted by sex stereotyping and therefore ut-terly lacking in probative value, unless proven to be in-
nocent. By this jurisprudentially unsound technique, 
plaintiff and the District Court took all unfavorable evi-
dence off the scales, effectively precluding Price Water-
house from bearing its burden of proof on liability. 
Second, plaintiff convinced the District Court that the 
decision to hold plaintiff's candidacy for one year was a 
career-ending decision despite the District Court's firm 
conviction that the holdover was nothing more than a reg-
ular Price Waterhouse process to correct perceived defi-ciencies in partnership candidates, and was employed in 
plaintiff's case in the same manner as with nineteen male 
colleagues the same year, 80% of whom advanced to part-
ner the next year. Thus, the District Court accepted as 
unavoidable and binding a previous ruling by this Court 
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that had failed to take into account that plaintiff was given 
a fair, reasonable and legitimate opportunity to make part-
ner that she intentionally and unreasonably undermined. 
These two incorrect factual impressions have led the 
District Court to believe that the plaintiff was a victim of 
a career-ending discriminatory employment decision, when, 
in fact, her personality not only brought about the decision 
suspending her candidacy but also was responsible for the 
decision ultimately terminating her eligibility for a Price 
Waterhouse partnership. Even if a few comments about 
plaintiff were tainted by "unconscious" (618 F. Supp. 1109, 
1118 (D.D.C. 1985)) sex stereotyping, they were not the 
cause of her ultimate misfortune and they may not be the 
basis for a judicially created Price Waterhouse partnership, 
even if Title VII could be construed to permit such a 
remedy. 
I. PRICE WATERHOUSE WOULD HAVE DEFERRED 
PLAINTIFF'S PARTNERSHIP CANDIDACY REGARD-
LESS OF HER GENDER 
A. Plaintiff Misperceives the Nature of Price Water-
house's Burden on Remand. 
Plaintiff concedes that "a number of negative comments 
about plaintiff' identified by Price Waterhouse "on their 
face are gender-neutral." Appellee's Br. at 13. She argues, 
however, that Price Waterhouse was not entitled to rely 
upon such comments to prove its case because plaintiff's 
expert witness testified that other comments reflected sex 
stereotyping and that facially neutral comments theoreti-
cally might nonetheless contain some trace elements of 
stereotypical attitudes. This approach to evidence and proof 
is jurisprudentially unsound and must be rejected. 
Plaintiffs identification through the testimony of her 
expert witness of some comments that were "couched in 
terms of her sex," Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 
458, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1987), may have been sufficient to shift 
the burden of proof to Price Waterhouse. But it never 
was established that the gender-neutral comments about 
plaintiffs interpersonal skills were tainted in any way by 
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stereotyping or that they amounted to anything more than 
what they stood for on their face-legitimate, nondiscri-
minatory, fact-based criticisms of plaintiffs conduct. See, 
e.g., 618 F. Supp. at 1117 (plaintiffs expert "did not pur• 
port to be able to determine whether or not any particular 
reaction was determined by the operation of sex stereo-
types"); Findings, App. at 225; see also Price Waterhouse 
v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1783 (1989). 1 
If the gender-neutral comments about plaintiffs inter-
personal relations are considered in the evidentiary equa-
tion, the proof is manifestly preponderant that Price 
Waterhouse would have made the same decision to defer 
plaintiffs partner.ship candidacy irrespective of her gen-
der.2 Plaintiff has not and cannot dispute this evaluation 
of the evidence. Instead, plaintiff contends that these crit-
icisms of her should be wholly disregarded because they 
might somehow have been influenced by the unacceptable 
comments even though she has not proven that they were. 
The District Court's error was to adopt this approach and 
ignore the gender-neutral comments altogether when eval-
uating the evidence under the preponderance of the evi-
dence standard. 3 That approach made it impossible for 
1 Thus, plaintiffs expert did not identify such neutral statements "as 
indicative of sex stereotyping." Appellee's Br. at 14. Indeed, during a 
hearing on remand, the District Court reiterated that plaintiffs "own 
expert said she could not determine whether those statements were 
sexist statements indicating a bias against women or whether they were 
correct statements of opinions of people who were not necessarily biased 
against women at all and she was unable to give the opinion and you 
put her on the stand." Tr. of Nov. 15, 1989 Hearing at 20; id. at 21· 
22 ("Your expert ... couldn't tell so I don 't know how I could tell."). 
Plaintiffs counsel agreed. Id at 22. 
• Even under the "clear and convincing evidence" standard, Judge 
Williams concluded that "the record here provided no causal connection 
between Hopkins' fate and [sex] stereotyping." 825 F.2d at 474 (Wil-
liams, J., dissenting). 
• The District Court did not suggest in its 1985 opinion that such an 
approach was necessary under the "clear and convincing evidence" 
standard of proof. It is thus all the more difficult to understand why 
the court assumed that the " less exacting" (Findings, App. at 219) 
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Price Waterhouse, as it would for any employer, to meet the burden of proving that legitimate criticisms would have led to the same employment decision. 
Plaintiff relies upon the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983), to support the District Court's conclusion that Price Waterhouse had the burden on remand to " 'separate out those comments tainted by sexism from those free of sex-ism.' " Appellee's Br. at 12, 14 (quoting Findings, App. at 227). But no such ostensible "rule" (Appellee's Br. at 14) can be extracted from Transportation Management. That case simply held that fairness considerations require that the defendant bear the risk of nonpersuasion in mixed-motive cases. See 462 U.S. at 400, 403; 109 S. Ct. at 1790. Transportation Management does not, as plaintiff main-tains, require a defendant literally to identify, concede and "separate out" additional impermissible factors that plaintiff herself found impossible to identify. Indeed, Transportation Management strongly suggests that Price Waterhouse's proof that other partnership candidates re-ceived similar treatment for " transgressions" similar to plaintiff's sufficiently demonstrated that the firm's decision to defer her candidacy was not discriminatory.• 
B. Plaintiff's Interpersonal Skills Problems Would Have Led to the Same Decision Regarding Her Partner-ship Candidacy Irrespective of Her Gender. 
Plaintiff contends that because Price Waterhouse has purportedly "failed to identify adverse comments made about plaintiff that were free of bias, there is no factual predicate for its claim that there was an independent, nondiscriminatory basis for her rejection." Appellee's Br. 
preponderance of the evidence standard imposed a new and affirmative burden on defendant to "identify each sexually stereotyped negative comment." Id. at 226. 
• 462 U.S. at 396-97, 404; cf. Air Line Pi.wt.a Ass 'n v. Ea.stern Air Lines, Inc., 863 F.2d 891 , 917 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Mikva, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane) (" there is often a history of employee terminations to which a court can compare the instant case" ) . 
·· -.··, 
. -,~ ... 
A ... 
•, ' ~ . ·.:-~ 
L -;.-~ 
- ... 
. ..,. ,,. 
5 
at 15. However, the District Court expressly found and repeatedly stated that plaintiff's behavior reflected "clear deficiencies" (Findings , App. at 231 n.8) that constituted a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory" basis for deferring her candidacy. See, e.g., 618 F. Supp. at 1114-16, 1120. That finding was not disturbed by this Court or the Supreme Court.6 
As Price Waterhouse demonstrated in its opening sub-mission, at 14-22, plaintiff's interpersonal skills generated complain ts throughout her career at the firm. 6 Plaintiff not only ignores the substance of these comments,7 but 
~ E.g., 109 S. Ct. _at 1791-92 ("The very premise of a mixed-motives case is that a legitimate reason was present, and indeed . . . Price Waterhouse has already made this showing" ) (emphasis added); 825 F.2d at 4 71 ("the trial judge expressly noted that the conce7m raised over Hopkins dealings with staff found support in the reccrrd and 'provided ample justification for the complaints that form the basis of the Policy Board's decision.' " ) (emphasis added) (quoting 618 F. Supp. at 1114). 
• "It is clear that the complaints about the plaintiff's interpersonal skills were not fabricated as a pretext for discrimination." 618 F. Supp. at 1114. 
Plaintiff complains that "Price Waterhouse dredges up every un-flattering comment ever made about plaintiff." Appellee's Br. at 16 n.5. Price Waterhouse, however, has set forth only a representative sample of the negative comments, a seemingly necessary and appro-priate approach to meeting its burden of proof. Unfortunately for plaintiff, the "unflattering comments" about her amounted to a "per-vasive theme in all of [the] discussions and the responses that came through the partner canvas, " Findings, App. at 222-23, as well as in annual performance reviews of plaintiff conducted "well before plaintiff wu--proposed for partnership." 618 F. Supp. at 1114; see App. at 16-36. She was held for reconsideration not because of a few unflattering comments but because of this pervasive theme. 
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also fails even to mention the direct testimony of a number of partners that the decision to def er her candidacy was based upon her conduct, not her sex. For example, plaintiff cites with approval that the firm's Chairman, Joseph E. Connor, regarded plaintiff as a "good capable profes-sional." Appellee's Br. at 16. But Mr. Connor testified twice-both in the 1985 and 1990 trials-that plaintiff de-served, at best, to be "held" for reconsideration. E.g., App. at 72-73, 210. 
Plaintiff has already litigated and lost the argument (Ap-pellee's Br. at 16-19) that male candidates with her short-comings were admitted to the partnership. The firm introduced a wealth of evidence that proved that, irre-spective of their sex, "candidates are regularly held be-cause of concerns about their interpersonal skills." 618 F. Supp. at 1116. The District Court expressly concluded that Price Waterhouse had "legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-sons for distinguishing between the plaintiff and the male partners with whom she compares herself," id. at 1115, and categorically rejected plaintiff's comparison with the two individuals identified by plaintiff (Appellee's Br. at 17 n.6) as peculiarly illustrative of her point. 618 F. Supp. at 1115. The record also contains ample and unrefuted proof that several other candidates whose interpersonal skills were not criticized as sharply as plaintiffs were nonetheless deferred because of interpersonal problems . See, e.g., App. at 172-91. 
Plaintiff's assertion, or wishful thinking, that male can-didates who were "held" because of perceived interper-
contact with her. Su App. at 54; 1985 Tr. at 277. Two partners who voiced strong criticisms of plaintiffs interpersonal skills in "Long Form" comments testified in the 1985 trial as to the nondiscriminatory bases of their concerns. Su Appellant's Br. at 16 n.5. There was no sug-gestion that these partners harbored any unstated discriminatory ani-mus toward plaintiff. Plaintiffs representations to this Court that only partners who had "the briefest encounters" with plaintiff "harshly crit-icized" her and that Price Waterhouse "declined" to "subjec~ ] those partners" to cross-examination are extremely misleading and manifestly incorrect. 
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7 
sonal difficulties were "lackluster candidates . . . who had 
problems with such things as practice development," and 
"technical skill[s]," Appellee's Br. at 17-18, is utterly with-
out substance. Most of the individuals to whom plaintiff 
has referred, id. at 18 n. 7, were rejected initially, not 
"held" for reconsideration. See Def. Ex. 64 & Def. Ex. 
69. The candidates most closely comparable to plaintiff, whose candidacies were held, were talented individuals, 
most of whom ultimately became partner. App. at 172-91. 
Moreover, although not a major issue in this case, plaintiff 
herself was not without criticism of her technical skills. 8 
Price Waterhouse's point, of course, is not to "talce 
shots" (Appellee's Br. at 19-20) at the District Court, but, 
with the greatest respect for the court below, to point out 
where and precisely how it erred in evaluating this case 
on remand. The court simply neutralized and nullified all 
negative comments, even facially neutral comments, re-
garding plaintiff because they were not proven to have 
been unaffected by "unarticulated, unconscious assump-
tions related to sex." 618 F. Supp. at 1118. Such an ap-
proach erects an intolerable, virtually insurmountable 
burden that cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court's 
mandate in this case. 
II. THE DECISION NOT TO REPROPOSE PLAINTIFF DID NOT RESULT IN A CONSTRUCTIVE DIS-
CHARGE 
Plaintiff has admitted that the decision not to repropose 
her for partner was "nondiscriminatory." Appellee's Br. 
at 10. In fact, the District Court found in 1985 and re-
emphasized in 1990 that a partnership candidacy deferral 
is part of an established Price Waterhouse process to en-
able, candidates to correct perceived deficiencies. See, e.g., 
Findings, App. at 231 n.8. Most "hold" candidates (nearly 
85% of them in plaintiff's year) go on to become partner. 
Thus, however unjust it might arguably have been to post-
• E.g .• App. at 37 ("She also demonstrated an apparent lack of tech skills"); id. at 38 ("I seriously questioned her tech knowledge of data processing"); id. at 39 ("[s}he is not tech respected"). 
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pone plaintiff's expectations in the first instance, she was subsequently given a legitimate, bona fide, nondiscrimi-natory opportunity to make partner, and she alone was responsible for the failure of that opportunity to bear fruit . Findings, App. at 240-42. It is therefore palpably wrong and bereft of any support in the record to conclude that the initial deferral was a career-tuding event . 
It is equally wrong, unreasonable and unjust to "couple" (825 F.2d at 473) plaintiff's self-imposed failure to be re-proposed with the antecedent act of discrimination and conclude that the two legally antithetical events combined to produce a career-ending constructive discharge. Just as an employee who "refuses a job substantially equivalent to one he was denied" "forfeits" his right to future relief, Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231-32 (1982), an employee whose "unreasonable intentional conduct" "ma-terially prevented a fair test of her performance" and "removed any possibility" (Findings, App. at 240-42) that she could receive the promotion she sought equally forfeits the right to additional relief. Cf. Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168, 1172 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (a plaintiff must demonstrate that she " 'was not the responsible agent in her own ter-mination' " to retain a right to prospective relief). 
Plaintiff does not, because she cannot, defend the factual basis for the linkage by the Court of Appeals of the non-discriminatory act with the action found discriminatory to establish a constructive discharge. Her argument that the District Court likened plaintiff's chances for partnership to a bolt of lightning, Appellee's Br. at 35 n.15, refers to a time after plaintiff had "materially prevented" a non-discriminatory opportunity to make partner. Of course her chances for partnership were greatly diminished after and as a consequence of plaintiff's misconduct in the Spring of 1983. That is precisely the point overlooked by the Court of Appeals that has led to the District Court's frus-tration with the remedy that it felt compelled to award. 9 




But this Court need not be bound by that clearly erroneous 
conclusion from a vacated opinion10 where doing so would 
result in a manifest unjustice. 
Plaintiff's only response to the inequity that would occur 
if the law of the case doctrine were applied blindly here 
is to argue that plaintiff never could have destroyed her 
own opportunity to make partner had she not been denied 
that opportunity the first time her candidacy was consid-
ered. But she is mistaken in her assumption that that 
initial wrong, if it was a wrong, allowed her to conduct 
herself without regard to her employment future from that 
point forward. 
Price Waterhouse does not argue " 'that a subsequent 
nondiscriminatory action can relieve a Title VII defendant 
of liability for an earlier discriminatory act.' " Appellee's 
Br. at 39 (quoting Findings, App. at 242). To the contrary, 
as the Supreme Court has expressly held, even after a 
discriminatory act, an employer can cut off future liability 
by affording a nondiscriminatory opportunity for the 
plaintiff to attain the position initially denied. See Ford 
dilemma" created by the conflict it perceived between this Court's 
constructive discharge holding and the District Court's view that plaintiff 
had "obviously lied" to a partner from her office and " that that was 
the fact that determined the failure to put her name up again" following 
the hold decision. Tr. of Nov. 15 1989 Hearing at 14-16, 33, 38. The 
District Court even suggested that this Court's constructive discharge 
ruling effectively "ordered [plaintiff] to be made a partner, " divesting 
it of discretion to consider plaintiffs inequitable conduct after the hold 
decision in determining relief. See, e.g., Tr. of Feb. 11, 1988 Hearing 
at 10; id. ("One reading of the opinion can be she has already won 
partnership and that's the end of it."); see also Tr. of Dec. 18, 1987 
Hearing at 4-6, 8. Thus, in its opinion on remand, the District Court 
reiterated that the "Court of Appeals' finding of constructive discharge 
has greatly elevated the import of the March 1983 hold decision" even 
though the District Court's "fundamental concern was not ~ith the 
preliminary hold decision." Findings , App. at 231-32 n.8. 
10 This Court's mandate " consists . . . of the Court's opinion and 
judgment." City of Cleveland v. Federal Power Commission, 561 F.2d 
344, 347 n.25 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Handbook of Practice and Internal 
Procedures XIII(2) (D.C. Cir. 1987). Thus, when this Court vacated its 
1987 mandate, it necessarily vacated its opinion as well. 
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10 
Motor Co., 458 U.S. at 231-32. If a plaintiff rejects or throws away this opportunity, she does not cut off the employer's liability for the injury initially caused, but she does eliminate liability from that point forward. Accord-ingly, if Price Waterhouse is liable at all to plaintiff, it is only for back pay for the year that she was denied a partnership, not for the future years for which plaintiff alone is solely accountable . 
III. PARTNERSHIP IS NOT AN AUTHORIZED TITLE VII REMEDY 
Plaintiff asserts that the Supreme Court's decision in Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984), "neces-sarily decided" that Title VII authorizes judicially created partnerships at the same time squarely conceding that the Court "in Hishon did not need to reach the remedial issue presented here." Appellee's Br. at 8, 22. In fact, Hishon stands for no more than the proposition that Title VII prohibits denial of a partnership on the basis of sex. 467 U.S. at 73-74, 77 n.10. But even if it may be a violation of Title VII discriminatorily to deny advancement to part-ner, that does not mean that Title VII authorizes the cre-ation of a partnership as a remedy for that violation. Neither the language nor the history of Title VII supports that conclusion. 11 
Nor does this Court's 1987 decision in this case even remotely imply, let alone "conclud[e] that . . . promotion to partner was a permissible remedy." Appellee's Br. at 24 n.11. The issue of partnership admission was not tried, briefed, or argued in 1985, and was not presented for review in this Court. 
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Although Title VII specifically mentions only "reinstate-ment or hiring of employees," as "employee[s]," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), plaintiff urges this Court to ignore the plain and obvious meaning of those words and read a partner-ship remedy into the statute because "Congress gave the Federal courts extremely broad remedial powers to vin-dicate the purposes of Title VII." Appellee's Br. at 22-23. It is well settled, however, that a statute's purposes must be "determined in the first instance with reference to the plain language of the statute itself." Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. Dimension Financial Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 373 (1986). Indeed, "[a]pplication of 'broad purposes' of legislation at the expense of specific provisions ignores. the complexity of the problems Con-gress is called upon to address . . . and, in the end, pre-vents the effectuation of congressional intent." Id. at 373-74. 
The Supreme Court's decision in County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981), is not to the contrary. Plaintiff relies upon Gunther's statement that courts should "avoid interpretations of Title VII that deprive victims of discrimination of a remedy, without clear congressional mandate." Id. at 178. Gunther, however, involved the ques-tion whether sex-based wage discrimination gave rise to Title VII liability at all, not whether the statute authorized a particular remedy. Merely because Title VII does not authorize the creation of partnerships does not "deprive victims of discrimination of a remedy." 12 It only means 
12 If a court finds Title VII liability for denial of partnership, it can order that the employee be reinstated as an employee and reconsidered for partnership or award damages to compensate for any resulting economic harm. Indeed, as the District Court observed here, "(t]his case is a money case . . . . That's why this case was brought, that's why this case is being tried." Tr. of Oct 3, 1989 Hearing at 13-14; see also Findings, App. at 235. Although plaintiffs failure to put on ad-equate proof (Findings , App. at 236) made "front pay" inappropriate in this case, such relief is certainly adequate to the task of making Title VII plaintiffs " whole. " 





.1. , • . 
I -: 
. : .• f:.. 

















• •Z • 
12 
that Congress did not authorize a particular form of rem-edy that courts of equity, from time immemorial, have not had and do not want. 13 
Other cases relied upon by plaintiff (Appellee's Br. at 24-32), are simply inapposite. Lander v. Lujan, 888 F.2d 153 (D.C. Cir. 1989), involved the reinstatement of a fed-eral civil service employee to "essentially the same job" as he had previously held (id. at 158), a remedy that falls squarely within the jurisdictional strictures of Title VII. Similarly, academic tenure cases, like Brown v. Trustees of Boston University, 891 F.2d 337 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied,. 110 S. Ct. 3217 (1990), add little to the inquiry. An order of tenure adds job security to a previously ex-isting employr:nent relationship and does not otherwise in-volve a fundamental change in status, duties or responsibilities. Title VII's plain language clearly permits such orders. 
The Supreme Court in Hishon may have rejected the argument that the First Amendment affirmatively protects the right to engage in " 'invidous private discrimination.' " 467 U.S. at 78. However, Price Waterhouse has never made any such First Amendment claim. Price Waterhouse does not contend that Title VII's application to the part-nership selection process violates the First Amendment, or that partnerships have a constitutional right to treat employees considered for partner unfairly because of their sex. Price Waterhouse submits only that, in light of the intimate nature of professional partnerships, the need for 
nership as a remedy "would also suggest that courts may not remedy 
discriminatory severance or retirement systems" (Appeilee's Br. at 26) 
is nonsensical. Price Waterhouse does not contend that "reinstatement 
or hiring of employees" and back pay are the only authorized remedies, 
but rather that only remedies connected to employment may be fash-
ioned under the statute. For example, restoration of discriminatorily 
denied pension benefits to a former employee, unlike partnership ad-
mission. is a remedy that is quite consistent with the specific employ-
ment-based remedies delineated in § 2000e-5(g). ,s Plaintiff has been unable to point to a single case in which a court 
ordered the creation of a partnership under any theory of liability. 





harmonious partner relationships, and the joint responsi-
bilities and liabilities that are implicit in such relationships, 
the First Amendment, as well as traditional notions of 
equity, require that such a remedy not be implied from a 
statute that does not directly or by clear and necessary 
implication create such a remedy. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRE-TION IN ORDERING PARTNERSHIP IN THIS CASE 
As Price Waterhouse has demonstrated (Appellant's Br. 
at 34-35), the District Court abused its discretion when it 
ordered the firm to admit plaintiff as a partner despite 
her self-acknowledged '_'considerable problems dealing with 
staff and peers." 618 F. Supp. at 1120. Cf Brown, 891 
F.2d at 361 (" there are no issues of collegiality or the like 
which might make the granting of tenure inappropriate"). 
Plaintiff objects to the relevance of her conduct and in-
terpersonal difficulties to the question of the appropriate-
ness of the partnership order because it purportedly 
"ignores the liability finding." Appellee's Br. at 31. But 
it cannot reasonably be disputed at this stage of the case 
that plaintiff's personality was a legitimate factor that con-
tributed significantly to the deferral of her partnership 
candidacy," and it is plaintiffs conduct after the hold de-
cision that makes it especially inappropriate and unfair to 
order that she be made a partner. That conduct " removed 
any possibility" that plaintiff would make partner in 1984 
and is certainly relevant to whether she should be made 
a partner now. 
"Plaintiff contends that the District Court's liability finding "mean(s] 
that discrimination based on sex was the reason plaintiff was placed 
on hold," and therefore the "natural remedy" was to require admission 
of plaintiff as a partner. Appellee's Br. at 30. However, a finding of 
liability in a "mixed-motive" case does not mean that sex discrimination 
was the sole cause of the employment decision, but rather only that a 
discriminatory factor was OM of the causes of the decision. Indeed, 
mixed-motive cases by definition involve multiple causal factors . 109 S. 
Ct. at 1785. Regardless of liability, plaintiffs clear deficiencies in in-
terpersonal skills also caused the hold decision . 
.;. 
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V. PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO MITIGATE CUTS OFF HER RIGHT TO RELIEF 
Plaintiff concedes that a "failure to mitigate damages . .. bars recovery altogether" but argues that the District Court simply faulted her for not earning "more than she did after leaving Price Waterhouse." Appellee's Br. at 9, 33. The District Court's opinion, however, makes clear that plaintiff's "unwillingness" even to seek a comparable po-sition, as well as her intentional misconduct after the hold decision, constituted a complete "fail[ure] to ... mitigate." Findings, App. at 247. Accordingly, plaintiff's relief, if any, must be limited to back pay for the one-year period prior to the point at which she could have made partner had she not prevented it herself or, at most, the additional period that it would have taken plaintiff to find a com-parable position had she taken reasonable steps to look for one . 
August 15, 1990 Respectfully submitted, 
OJ Counsel: THEODORE B. OLSON 
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